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Consequences of Frequent Exposure
to the Cognitive Reflection Test for
Mechanical Turk Participants
Jan K. Woike*
Center for Adaptive Rationality (ARC), Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin, Germany
Participants from public participant panels, such as Amazon Mechanical Turk, are shared
across many labs and participate in many studies during their panel tenure. Here, I
demonstrate direct and indirect downstream consequences of frequent exposure in three
studies (N1−3 = 3, 660), focusing on the cognitive reflection test (CRT), one of the most
frequently used cognitive measures in online research. Study 1 explored several variants
of the signature bat-and-ball item in samples recruited from Mechanical Turk. Panel
tenure was shown to impact responses to both the original and merely similar items.
Solution rates were not found to be higher than in a commercial online panel with less
exposure to the CRT (Qualtrics panels, n = 1, 238). In Study 2, an alternative test with
transformed numeric values showed higher correlations with validation measures than
the original test. Finally, Study 3 investigated sources of item familiarity and measured
performance on novel lure items.
Keywords: cognitive reflection test (CRT), professional participants, Mechanical Turk (MTurk), online research,
practice effects
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Professional Participants on Amazon Mechanical Turk
On Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform (MTurk) participants (called “workers”) complete
small tasks (“Human intelligence tasks” or “HITs”) offered by employers (“requesters”) against
monetary payment. A few years after its introduction in 2005 (Paolacci et al., 2010), academics
discovered its potential as a platform for conducting research. A claimed participant pool of up to
500,000 international workers compared favorably with typical university pools regarding size and
heterogeneity. Moreover, given the low average payment rates especially prevalent in the platform’s
early days (Ipeirotis, 2010; Paolacci et al., 2010) and the impressive speed of data collection,
researchers soon embraced the platform to a degree never encountered before. MTurk has been
hailed as “a revolutionary tool for conducting experiments” (Crump et al., 2013, p. 16) with the
potential to transform the conduct of behavioral research. Indeed, many disciplines have begun to
routinely use MTurk samples, including many subfields of psychology (Crump et al., 2013; Landers
and Behrend, 2015; Chandler and Shapiro, 2016; Cheung et al., 2017).
As with any novel disruption to established sampling procedures (like computer testing
and online research in earlier years), critics soon attacked research relying on MTurk
participants on dimensions such as data quality, participant authenticity, and sample
representativeness. Most investigators have concluded that both in terms of attention and
quality, data collected on MTurk was not inferior to data collected from student and
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other convenience samples (Crump et al., 2013; Landers
and Behrend, 2015; Hauser and Schwarz, 2016; McCredie
and Morey, 2018; Coppock, 2019). Samples from established
professional online panels have been found to be more
representative of the general population than MTurk
samples, but not to be necessarily of higher quality
(Kees et al., 2017).
New—and more persistent—questions emerged, when
researchers realized that participants in crowdsourced online
panels had a much longer tenure in these panels than student
participants with limited programs of study at research
institutions. Critics argued that these “professional participants”
might differ from traditional participants in criticial aspects
(Dennis, 2001; Hillygus et al., 2014; Matthijsse et al., 2015).
At first, the reported size of the MTurk population seemed
to address this problem sufficiently, but two developments
contributed to its reemergence: Stewart et al. (2015) found
that the population of participants available to any given lab
was far below the reported number and closer to around 7,000
participants, similar to the size of university pools.
Further, research activity on MTurk exploded with
many overlapping research questions being investigated
simultaneously, making it very likely that participants—who
self-select into studies (Stewart et al., 2017)—were exposed
to the same scenarios, tasks and test items multiple times
(Chandler et al., 2014). Participants on MTurk have participated
in many more academic studies on average than members of
earlier panels (Stewart et al., 2017) with some evidence for
decreased effect sizes for returning participants in experiments
(Chandler et al., 2015).
1.2. Repeated Exposure to the Cognitive
Reflection Test
Practice effects, increases in test performance through repeated
test taking, are a common phenomenon for many cognitive
tests (see e.g., Calamia et al., 2012). Many tasks on MTurk
are encountered frequently by active participants, for example
behavioral economics games such as the dictator or ultimatum
game. Of particular concern regarding practice effects are
questions with correct answers that could be learned either
by repeated engagement, conversation between participants, or
searching outside the platform. One of the most heavily used
tasks in psychological and economic studies with memorizable
correct answers is the cognitive reflection test (CRT, Frederick,
2005, the three items are shown in Table 1). Cognitive reflection
is “the ability or disposition to resist reporting the response that
first comes to mind” (Frederick, 2005, p. 35). The original CRT
(Frederick, 2005) consists of three questions that have intuitive
and commonly given answers that turn out to be false upon
further reflection (Toplak et al., 2014). The signature question is
the bat-and-ball question (I1 in Table 1).
While many participants prize the ball at ten cents, a quick
check will show that this would place the bat at $1.10 adding up
to a total price of $1.20. The correct solution is given by
x+ (x+ $1.00) = $1.10⇔ 2x = $0.10⇔ x = $0.05. (1)
The first item is followed by two similar items that can trick
respondents into false, yet intuitive responses.
Toplak et al. (2011) described the CRT as a “measure of the
tendency toward the class of reasoning error that derives from
miserly processing” (p. 1284). CRT scores have been shown to
correlate with numeracy (Cokely et al., 2012), verbal intelligence
(Bialek and Pennycook, 2017), and SAT1 scores (Frederick,
2005), but also skepticism (Pennycook et al., 2015), religious
disbelief (Gervais and Norenzayan, 2012; Stagnaro et al., 2019),
economically advantageous decision-making (Corgnet et al.,
2015). and lower risk aversion (Noori, 2016). Baron et al. (2015)
considered the CRT to be “one of the most useful measures in
the study of individual differences in thinking, judgments, and
decisions” (p. 266).
Both the items and their solutions have been popularized
since the test’s introduction in books, classrooms and newspaper
articles (e.g., Postrel, 2006; Lubin, 2012). The popularity of the
test (and the associated research) is perceived as a double-edged
sword by cognitive researchers. It has generated a rich base of
data for comparison, but might also lead to increased familiarity
with the items. In an earlier study, Goodman et al. (2013)
did not find significant differences between an MTurk and a
community sample, and MTurk participants scored lower, on
average, than student samples. Given the likelihood of repeated
exposure to the test items, Toplak et al. (2014, p. 149) saw
“problems on the horizon for the CRT going into the future.”
It can presently be assumed that the test has been encountered
by the typical MTurk participant (Stewart et al., 2017). In a
study in 2015, more than 75% of MTurk participants reported
to have seen it before (Hauser and Schwarz, 2015), with similar
results in Haigh (2016) with a sample of online volunteers and
participants on Prolific Academic. Bialek and Pennycook (2017)
found in an analysis of six studies with a total of about 2,500
participants that average scores of participants with pre-exposure
were substantially higher than scores from naive participants
(M = 1.65 vs. M = 1.02 for all participants, M = 1.70
vs. M = 1.20 for MTurk participants), and higher than the
scores of Princeton or Harvard students (Frederick, 2005). Haigh
(2016) reported that themajority of their participants reached the
maximum score, with higher scores for participants with prior
exposure (M = 2.36 vs.M = 1.48). For the bat-and-ball problem
alone, the relative frequency of correct solutions increased from
40.7% to 73.8%. Thomson and Oppenheimer (2016) observed an
even higher degree of prior exposure (94%) in a sample of MTurk
participants with master qualification. Participants in Argentina
(Campitelli and Labollita, 2010, M = 0.66) and Australia
(Campitelli and Gerrans, 2014, M = 0.94) had lower average
scores than all groups of MTurk participants, even those in
Goodman et al. (2013).
How do higher scores impact current research? Different
mechanisms and behaviors could, in theory, be responsible for
1The SAT has been and still is the most widely used standardized test to
determine admissions to college in the US; it was developed by the Educational
Testing Service.
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TABLE 1 | Original CRT items and items presented in Studies 1–3: study, variant name, item text, correct solution, and intuitive solution.
Study Variant Question Corr. Int.
CRT I1 A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball $0.05 $0.10
How much does the ball cost?
I2 If it takes 5 machines 5 min to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines 5 m 100 m
to make 100 widgets?
I3 In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size 47d 24d
If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the
patch to cover half of the lake?
Study 1 Original A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball 5 10
How much does the ball cost? [in cents]
Complementary A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball 105 100
How much does the bat cost? [in cents]
Trivial A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs more than the ball. It costs $1.00 10 10
How much does the ball cost? [in cents]
Transformed A golden bat and a golden ball cost $5,000 in total. The golden bat costs $4,000 more 500 1,000
than the golden ball. How much does the golden ball cost? [in $]
Study 2 (CRTt) T1 A golden bat and a golden ball cost $5,000 in total. The golden bat costs $4,000 more 500 1,000
than the golden ball. How much does the golden ball cost? [in $]
T2 If it takes 10 machines 10 min to make 10 widgets, how long would it take 10 1,000
1,000 machines to make 1,000 widgets [in minutes]?
T3 In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size 38 10
If it takes 40 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would
it take for the patch to cover a quarter of the lake [in days]?
Study 3 I1 A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball 5 10
How much does the ball cost? [in cents]
I2 If it takes 5 machines 5 min to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 5 100
100 machines to make 100 widgets? [in minutes]
N1 Peter has four friends. Together they are able to carry 40 boxes. 160/168 200
If Peter had 20 friends instead, how many boxes would they be able to carry?
N2 If you divided a long baguette by four cuts into even pieces, each piece would 10 9
be 18 cm long. How long would a piece be if you did it with eight cuts? [in cm]
score increases: (a) active search for solutions2, (b) accidentally
finding item solution in classrooms, books, or online, (c)
reflecting on the items after the task, (d) suspecting a hidden layer
of complexity when encountering a seemingly simple item for the
second time. The impact on test validity would depend on the
mechanism and the degree of insight into the problem. Chandler
et al. (2014) observed, for example, that the number of previous
HITs on MTurk correlated with the performance on the original
CRT items, but not with the performance on variants of these
items, consistent with a rather narrow learning of solutions. For
these reasons Goodman and Paolacci (2017, p. 9) called the CRT
a “confounded measure” on MTurk and Haigh (2016) expressed
concerns about the future of the test, arguing that the groups
that were most likely to be exposed to the solutions in popular
media or university classes were exactly the groups most likely
to be studied with the CRT. Thomson and Oppenheimer (2016)
called MTurk a “corrupted subject pool for cognitive reflection”
2Stieger and Reips (2016) observed several thousand search results for the exact
phrase “a bat and a ball cost” (my search in June 2019 returned 12,700, a search for
“a ball and a bat cost” returned 1,370 pages).
(p. 102), and addressed this problem with others (Toplak et al.,
2014) by extending the test’s item set.
Following these expressions of concern, several authors
recently tested the impact of prior experience on CRT validity
empirically. These studies replicated the score increase with
repeated exposure, but did not find a decrease in test validity. In
their set of studies, Bialek and Pennycook (2017) found similar
correlations between CRT and target variables for experienced
and inexperienced participants and concluded that “[t]he CRT
is robust to multiple testing, and there is no need to abandon it
as an individual difference measure.” This advice was echoed by
Meyer et al. (2018) and Stagnaro et al. (2018).
Meyer et al. (2018) analyzed data for 14,000 participants across
experiments featuring the CRT and found substantial score
increases only for those that actively remembered the items. At
the same time, it should be noted, that this percentage increased
from about 54% to 92% with repeated participation (Meyer et al.,
2018, calculated from Table 4). The authors found a positive
correlation between performance and remembering, and, more
importantly, that performance after one or more exposures was
still a good proxy of initial performance: Correlations with
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SAT scores and general intelligence tests did not suffer. The
authors concluded for the CRT that “in the most heavily exposed
population, scores exhibit ample variance, are surprisingly
stable, and retain their predictive validity, even when they
change” (p. 249).
Stagnaro et al. (2018) re-analyzed eleven studies with over
3,000 participants who participated in multiple studies and
confirmed a high correlation between first and last CRT scores.
In addition, they demonstrated that CRT scores at the two most
extreme points in time (with a median of 221 days apart) each
enabled the prediction of target variables measured at both times.
While 25.9% of participants achieved higher and only 9.8%
lower scores at the latter point (Stagnaro et al., 2018, calculated
from Table 1, upper panel), they found “strong evidence that
performance on CRT is stable over time” (p. 265), based on a
test-retest correlation of r = 0.81.
Finally, Raoelison and DeNeys (2019) directly tested the effect
of repeated exposure to the bat-and-ball question within one
experiment by confronting participants in sequence with 110
problems including 50 variants of the task. In their analysis of
a sample of 62 participants, 38 gave incorrect and 14 correct
responses from start to finish. Only the remaining 10 seemed
improved during the experiment. From one perspective, this
illustrates the robustness of responses, as most participants
behaved consistently throughout the experiment. On the other
hand, of those participants who could learn, 10 of 48 (21%)
profited from repeated exposure, which again could be counted
as evidence for a practice effect.
1.3. A Test Case for Repeated Exposure in
Crowdsourced Research
In unsupervised test settings and on the internet, item exposure
has the potential to compromise items (Tippins et al., 2006;
Burke, 2009; Guo et al., 2009). Direct sources for indirect learning
by MTurk participants are online discussion boards and sites
set up to allow for worker interaction and platform-related
information transfer. According to Stewart et al. (2017), 60%
of the workers used forums and 10% reported they had direct
contacts with other MTurk participants. Most boards promote
norms of not disclosing experimental details to protect the use
of MTurk for academic research, but it is easy to find solutions
to the bat-and-ball problem online. On the site TurkerNation,
Milland (2015) lists the correct answers to the CRT as an example
of common knowledge due to repeated exposure. Learning the
solution from this post would not require cognitive reflection3.
Here, I treat the CRT as a test case for studying the
consequences of the repeated use of experimental stimuli or item
pools in large online participant pools. Most previous studies on
repeated exposure to the CRT focused on the effect of familiarity
on the validity and reliability of scores measured with items
from the original material. Learning effects, as argued above,
can be considered relatively benign, if they result from direct
3It is evident that some MTurk participants acquire solutions via channels like
these, as exemplified by discussions between forum users on sites likeMTurkforum
or TurkerHub, who admit to repeating solutions they have not understood or teach
others about correct answers to the problem.
learning and cognitive reflection on the items. Learning is likely
to be less benign if it results from (mindless) memorization of
indirectly learned numbers. Given the prevalence of the task,
opportunities for indirect learning possibly increase over time.
One way to distinguish between mindless memorization and
genuine learning as explanations for practice effects, is the use
of parallel test forms (Rapport et al., 1997; Davey and Nering,
2002; Bartels et al., 2010; Calamia et al., 2012), which has been
found to decrease practice effects across many studies (Kulik
et al., 1984b; Benedict and Zgaljardic, 1998; Beglinger et al., 2005).
This approach will be explored throughout the three studies in
this manuscript.
As a specific feature of the testing environment on MTurk,
both direct and indirect learning related to the CRT can
easily have consequences for participants’ performance in other
tasks. The ecological environment of MTurk is unique in that
participants have prior experience with potentially thousands
of academic studies that might have contained stimuli that are
variants of or even merely resemble stimuli or experimental
conditions featured in any given MTurk study.
Study 1 focused on responses to the signature item of the
CRT and three item variants, demonstrating the existence of
memorization and task confusion on MTurk in contrast to
a comparable survey population. Study 2 used a transformed
variant of the CRT to address these concerns and presented
encouraging results. Study 3 directly addressed sources of
memorization and tested the viability of entirely novel items on
the platform.
2. STUDY 1: COMPARISON OF ITEM
VARIANTS
In Study 1, MTurk participants faced one of four variants
of the bat-and-ball question—the original and more or less
subtle variations. The bat-and-ball question has arguably received
the most attention and publicity of the three tasks (Bago
and De Neys, 2019). The variants were designed to explore
participants’ tendency to transfer correct (and false) solutions
to variants of the original task and to explore downstream
consequences of exposure for repeated and related tasks—in
terms of both process and outcome changes.
2.1. Research Questions
The design of Study 1 was guided by several research questions
that it was intended to answer. The overarching question is
Research Question 1:
Research Question 1. How do MTurk participants respond to the
bat-and-ball problem?
This question can be addressed on several levels: On the
response level, I was interested in the distribution of responses,
in particular the relationship between intuitive and correct
responses. On the process level, the theoretical conceptualization
of the CRT allows predictions about differences in response times
between respondents falling into different answer categories.
To gain more detailed insight into the process, Study 1
employed several item variants. Two of these variants closely
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resembled the original item, but differed in crucial aspects.
Observing reactions to these items could address the first part
of Research Question 2. Specifically, answers expected for the
original item could only be expected to occur for these variants,
if participants relied on memorized answers and did not closely
read the presented item. A third variant was created that differed
visibly from the original and varied the numbers. Analyzing
responses to this variant allowed to address the second part of
Research Question 2.
Research Question 2. How do participants react to subtle
variations of the original item and can they generalize the solution
to a transformed problem?
Participants were also asked about the amount of work they had
completed on the platform and whether they had encountered
the bat-and-ball problem before. This allowed to analyze
the relationship between general and specific experience and
response patterns (Research Question 3).
Research Question 3. How are responses influenced by panel
tenure and exposure to the CRT?
Finally, a second sample from a different platform was analyzed
to address the question whether the obtained results are limited
toMTurk or rather a broad phenomenon that generalized beyond
the platform (Research Question 4).




The study was conducted on MTurk as part of a series of HITs
in 2016. The HITs were announced to last 12–25 min for most
participants and offered a fixed payment between $1.00 and $1.10
with an average bonus payment of $0.60–$0.75. Participation was
restricted to US participants. Most HITs (n1 = 1, 966) required
a minimum percentage of 95% accepted HITs and a minimum of
50 completed HITs4. In addition, 395 participants were recruited
without this qualification. A group of 1,186 participants passed
one of two consecutive attention checks, while 780 participants
were not required to pass attention checks5. Participants were on
average 34.9 years old (SD = 11.7 years), and 54.5% categorized
themselves as female (44.9% as male). The median number of
previously completed HITs was 1,000 (M = 11, 135, SD =
61, 108). Themedian of weekly time spent on the platformwas 10
h. In all studies, participants gave informed consent at the start of
the survey, and all studies were approved by the IRB at the Center
for Adaptive Rationality in Berlin.
2.2.2. Survey Questions
The CRT item was presented within a Qualtrics survey. MTurk
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four variants of
4Incidentally, this combination allowed workers to participate who had 51–99
HITs and did not meet the 95% standard.
5Assignment to conditions was random for all subsets. The
Supplementary Material section 2.1.5 contains a discussion of the merits of
attention checks for CRT studies, and analyzes the relationship between attention
check and CRT performance.
the bat-and-ball problem (see Table 1): (1) the original (n1.1 =
457), (2) the trivial (n1.2 = 479), (3) the complementary
(n1.3 = 473), and (4) the transformed variant (n1.4 = 557). In
addition to the collection of responses and response times, all
participants were asked to indicate whether they had encountered
the item (or a similar item), before. All items are listed in the
Supplementary Material section 1.1.
The original variant is the question mostly used in the three-
item form of the CFT (Frederick, 2005). Both the trivial and
the complementary variant allow to differentiate remembered
answers to the original problem from answers to the posed
problem. Asking for the price of the bat instead of the price of the
ball does not change the structure and complexity of the problem.
The correct solution (105 cents) is the complement of the original
solution (5 cents). The potential intuitive solution (100 cents)
is the complement of the former intuitive solution (10 cents). For
the trivial variant, the intuitive response is the correct response as
the solution is the simple difference $1.10−$1 = $0.10. A related
variant was introduced by De Neys et al. (2013) in the form: “A
magazine and a banana together cost $2.90. The magazine costs
$2. How much does the banana cost?” (p. 270), which was solved
by 98% of participants. Similarly, Raoelison and De Neys (2019)
and Bago and De Neys (2019) included “no-conflict” problems
with this structure, and Raoelison and De Neys (2019) reported
solution rates of 99%.
The “transformed variant” is a variant with the original
problem structure but changed monetary values. A transformed
variant in this sense is already featured in Frederick (2005). The
banana-and-bagel problem is described as an analogous problem
with a higher requirement for computation: “A banana and a
bagel cost 37 cents. The banana costs 13 cents more than the
bagel. How much does the bagel cost?” (p. 28). In this case,
24 cents (37 − 13) is a more easily disqualified answer, and
Frederick (2005) found respondents to perform much better on
this transformed problem than on the original. The similar soup-
and-salad problem in Finucane and Gullion (2010) was again
solved by a higher number of participants (65%, see Table S3)
than the original problem (29%), and did not generate frequent
intuitive answers in Baron et al. (2015, p. 273, footnote 7).
Applying the structure-mapping model for word problems
(Reed, 1987) to the variants used in this study, only the
transformed variant can be considered isomorphic to the original
problem. Both the trivial and the complementary variant share
surface elements and a similar story with the original item
but require different calculation procedures. Participants with
previous exposure to the original item would be expected to be
challenged by the merely similar items. The story similarity for
transformed variant, on the other hand, should help to apply
the correct procedure (Ross, 1989), unless the solution is merely
memorized as a number.
2.3. Results
2.3.1. Correct and False Answers
Answers to the standard CRT items are often categorized into
three categories; namely (a) correct responses, (b) false, but
intuitive responses, and (c) false, and non-intuitive responses.
Baron et al. (2015) considered items to be lure-items, if one false
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FIGURE 1 | Relative frequencies of response categories for the four question variants in Study 1 [(A) original, (B) complementary, (C) trivial, and (D) transformed
variant] in percent: All non-listed responses are categorized as Other, error bars mark the 95% CI of the proportion.
and intuitive answer is both a frequent response and also themost
frequent false response. In addition to these three categories,
I formed separate categories for correct and false intuitive
responses to the original problem, if those differed from correct
and false intuitive answers to the problem variant, resulting in
five response categories for the complementary variant and three
categories for the trivial problem (in which the intuitive and
correct category otherwise overlap). Results for the four variants
are summarized in Figures 1A–D.
Responses to the standard version fell into the expected
categories (see Figure 1A), with 43.5% correct answers (5
cents) and 53.2% false and intuitive answers (10 cents; only
3.3% of answers were different from 5 and 10 cents). This
percentage is comparable to previous studies on MTurk, but the
correct proportion was higher than the rate observed in earlier
lab studies.
Answers to the complementary problem (see Figure 1B) fell
into more than three major categories: The correct response
($1.05) was given by only 20.7% of participants, the false and
intuitive response ($1.00) by 18% of participants. It should be
noted in particular that the majority of participants gave an
answer corresponding to the price of the ball, the focus of the
original question. Of all answers, 18.2% gave the correct response
to the original question (5 cents), and 38.6% the intuitive, false
response to the original question (10 cents). Among the answers
focusing on the wrong target object, the intuitive answers were
more frequent than among the answers focusing on the correct
target object.
In spite of the fact that the intuitive response to the
trivial version (see Figure 1C) is indistinguishable from the
correct response (10 cents), only 83.5% of the responses
were correct. A substantial number of respondents
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(13.3%) responded with the solution to the original
question (5 cents)6.
The transformed question (see Figure 1D) had the same
answer categories as the original: The correct response ($500)
was given by 36.6% of participants, the false intuitive response
($1,000) by 57.8% of participants. This high percentage indicates
that the transformed item can still be considered a lure item,
in contrast to previously used transformed items (Finucane and
Gullion, 2010; Baron et al., 2015).
Comparing the response patterns across items allows for
a preliminary interpretation. Answers to the original problem
replicated the elevated rates of correct responses on MTurk
relative to naive laboratory student participants. Answers to the
complementary problem illustrate the effect of prior experience:
The majority of respondents gave an answer expected for
the original variant, although the complementary variant is
merely similar, not equivalent to the original (Reed, 1987).
This exemplifies the potential of surface similarities that are
detached from structural similarities to impede performance
(Ross, 1989; Lee et al., 2015) and to interfere with transfer
(Morley et al., 2004).
It is unlikely that the responses were produced by simple
errors, as $1.05 is an unlikely answer in the original task. Both the
correct and the false answer are reproduced, albeit not at the same
rate: The false answer to the original problem was much more
likely to be reproduced than the correct answer. This validates the
CRT scale on ameta-level: Participants who demonstrated higher
cognitive reflection on the original test were able to realize the
difference between expected task and presented task more easily.
Further, many participants did not seem to read the task in detail.
Responses to the trivial variant confirmed that some participants
reproduced answers to the original question when facing a much
simpler question, either due to a lapse of attentiveness or to the
reproduction of a memorized response without insight.
This is consistent with comparisons with transformed variants
in Chandler et al. (2014), who found similar solution rates
(around 54%) for both7, and Meyer et al. (2018) (both
around 40%).
Regarding threats to validity, it might be reassuring to see
in answers to the complementary variant that false answers to
the original problem seemed to be remembered at similar if not
higher rates than correct answers. The accurate reproduction of
previous answers certainly increases the reliability of a test. At
the same time, this would also imply that the involved cognitive
processes (reasoning vs. remembering) are dissimilar between
first and subsequent exposure. The relationship between response
types and both process and external variables should therefore
sharpen the sketched interpretation.
6If one assumes that these participants would have given the intuitive and correct
response without prior exposure, the proportion of both groups together is close
to the 98% correct responses observed for a similar trivial variant in De Neys et al.
(2013) or the 99% in Raoelison and De Neys (2019).
7A re-analysis of their published data revealed that the number of participants who
solved the original but not the transformed problem was the same as the number
of participants who solved the transformed but not the original problem (16% of
the sample each, 37% solve both variants).
2.3.2. Response Times
Item response times can help to identify items that may have
been compromised by public exposure (Burke, 2009; Choe
et al., 2018). The original distributions of response times were
severely right-skewed, therefore all values were log-transformed
before analysis (see the Supplementary Material section 2.1.1).
Here, I compare differences in log-transformed response times
between participants whose responses fell into the categories
discussed above (see Figure 2, left column). For the original
task, intuitive responses were given faster than correct responses,
but the difference was relatively small (dc−i = 0.1, 95% CI =
[0.03, 0.16]). This is consistent with the idea that two groups of
participants remembered and reproduced correct and incorrect
responses, respectively, which diluted potential differences for
naive participants.
Direct evidence for reproduction from memory was found
for the complementary variant. Answers relating to the value of
the ball were indeed given much faster than answers relating to
the value of the bat, both for correct (do−c = 0.37, 95% CI =
[0.27, 0.48]) and intuitive answers (do−c = 0.42, 95% CI =
[0.33, 0.50]). There was little difference in response times between
correct and false answers for the bat, the correct answer was even
produced slightly faster (dc−f = −0.06, 95% CI = [−0.17, 0.05]).
It might well be the case that some participants produced the
answer by subtracting the memorized answer from the total, with
a speed advantage for respondents with higher CRT scores that
predict higher numeracy (Cokely et al., 2012).
The improper original answer to the trivial problem was
likewise given very fast, and faster than the correct answer
(do−c = −0.22, 95% CI = [−0.31,−0.13]) consistent with
a reproduction from memory. Response times for answers to
the transformed problem showed the clearest evidence for the
intuitive answer to be produced faster than the correct answer
(di−c = −0.39, 95% CI = [−0.46,−0.31]). As this task was
novel, a simple reproduction of answers from memory was not
possible and response times were therefore also much slower
than for the original item. Large differences were also observed in
Chandler et al. (2014).
Based on this finding, one might speculate that most
participants who solved the original problem were not simply
producing a learned response (some might have, though) but
generalized the original solution to a transformed task (presented
for the first time on MTurk, to the best of my knowledge). On
the other hand, a higher proportion of MTurk participants than
typical lab participants has directly or indirectly learned how to
solve the bat-and-ball problem, even when it is presented in a
transformed version.
2.3.3. MTurk Tenure
Participants’ estimates of the number of prior HITs was
interpreted as a measure of tenure and experience. These
estimates showed a similarly right-skewed distribution as
response times, and were likewise log-transformed before
analysis8. As reported before (e.g., Haigh, 2016), participants who
gave the correct answer to the original problem (results are shown
8Responses of zero for two participants were set to one (counting the present HIT).
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FIGURE 2 | Relationship between response categories and response time/number of HITs in Study 1: Plots show average values of the log-transformed response
time (left column) and the log-transformed number of previous HITs (right column). Each row contains the plots for one of the four task variants (from top to bottom:
original, complementary, trivial, transformed); whiskers correspond to the 95% CI of the mean.
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FIGURE 3 | (A) Average proportion of correct answers to the original variant of the problem for participants that indicated experience (black dots) or no experience
(with dots) with the bat-and-ball problem, separated by the category of previous HITs on MTurk. Dot areas correspond to the proportions of participants with and
without experience for a given interval of HITs. Whiskers indicate 95% CIs for the proportions. (B) Percentage of correct responses to the original variant (circles) and
the trivial variant (triangles) for participant groups whose stated number of previous HITs falls into different categories. Whiskers indicate 95% CIs for the proportions.
in Figure 2, right column) were more experienced on average
than participants who gave the intuitive, false answer (dc−i =
0.32, 95% CI = [0.15, 0.49]).
Participants who erroneously gave the corresponding answers
for the ball for the complementary variant were more
experienced than those answering in regard to the bat. This
difference was more pronounced for the two “reflective” answers
($0.05 vs. $1.05, dbl−bt = 0.37, 95%CI = [0.08, 0.65]), than
for the intuitive answers ($0.10 vs. $1.00, dbl−bt = 0.15,
95% CI = [−0.05, 0.36]). The pattern for the transformed variant
was similar to the pattern for the original, but with a smaller
difference between the two answer categories (dc−i = 0.11,
95% CI = [−0.04, 0.27])9. The most extreme difference was
observed for the trivial problem: participants who responded
with the original answer were far more experienced than those
who responded with the correct answer (do−c = 0.8, 95% CI =
[0.56, 1.04]).
Participants were also asked whether they had seen the same
or a similar problem before, and the analysis aligned with the
analysis for tenure (see Supplementary Material section 2.1.2).
All results were consistent with answer memorization by a
certain percentage of participants. The results found for Chandler
et al. (2014) could be replicated: Participants who solved the
original problem had a significantly higher number of HITs (log-
transformed) than those who did not [F(1,455) = 16.20, p < 0.001,
partial η2 = 0.03]. This did not hold for the transformed problem
[F(1,555) = 1.04, p = 0.31, partial η
2
= 0.002].
9A re-analysis of the data in Chandler et al. (2014) revealed that participants who
had solved the original problem had significantly more previous HITs than those
who did not [F(1,98) = 5.65, p = 0.02], which was not true for the transformed
problem: [F(1,98) = 0.08, p = 0.78]. Similarly, solving the original version was a
significant predictor [χ2(1) = 4.03, N = 100, p = 0.045, asymptotic 2-sided test]
of “Super Turker” status, while performance on the new test was not [χ2(1) = 1.24,
N = 97, p = 0.27].
2.3.4. General and Specific Experience
The simultaneous effects of general and specific experience are
shown in Figure 3A. Participants who stated that they had not
seen the problem before answered the question at a relatively
constant rate, no matter how many HITs had been completed.
For participants who indicated familiarity, there was a clear
effect of tenure on MTurk, the proportion of correct responses
increased from rates comparable to earlier studies with naive
participants (Frederick, 2005) to an average value of 80% for
the most experienced participants. Consistent with expectations,
the proportion of inexperienced participants decreased with the
number of HITs.
The inverse effect of experience on solving the trivial task
is illustrated in Figure 3B by contrasting solution rates for the
original and trivial problem. Experience on MTurk is positively
related to solving the original task, but negatively to solving
the trivial task. The transformed task showed a decreased
dependence on platform tenure than the original task, but
a similar structure regarding answer types. Some participants
might have learned the principle that allowed them to solve the
transformed task by being exposed to the original task.
2.3.5. Comparison With Data From a Different Online
Panel
To establish whether the score improvement over time is
unique to MTurk or a general phenomenon, I re-analyzed the
CRT data (n = 1, 238) collected using Qualtrics Panels in
2018 in the context of Lewandowsky et al. (in preparation,
see the Supplementary Material sections 1.2, 2.1.3 for details).
Response patterns markedly differed from responses on MTurk.
The percentage of correct solutions to the bat-and-ball question
was clearly much lower (11.7%, see Figure 4A) and the
percentage of false, intuitive answers correspondingly higher. As
panel participants answered all three CRT items, test scores could
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FIGURE 4 | (A) Relative frequencies of response categories for the standard
variant (Qualtrics data, n = 1, 238): All non-listed responses are categorized as
Other, error bars mark the 95% CI of the proportion. (B) Average
log-transformed response time for the standard variant (Qualtrics data);
whiskers correspond to the 95% CI of the mean.
be computed for this sample: The average score across the three
items was 0.45, with 72.1% of the sample not solving a single item
correctly and only 4.8% solving all.
Response times for the online panel (see Figure 4B) were
generally longer on average than for the MTurk sample.
The difference in log-transformed times between correct and
intuitive answers (dc−i = 0.28, 95% CI = [0.23, 0.33]) is
similarly pronounced as for the transformed variant and more
pronounced than for the standard variant on MTurk. The
Supplementary Material section 2.1.4 features further analyses
of differences between successful and unsuccessful participants
in relation to gender and household income.
2.4. Discussion
Going back to the research questions that motivated Study 1,
some responses can be offered based on the observed results.
Regarding Research Question 1, most participants’ responses
were categorized as intuitive, but the proportion of correct
responses was higher than in older studies (and consistent
with more recent studies). Further, response time differences
between correct and intuitive responses were relatively small,
which is somewhat inconsistent with the theoretical foundation
for these categories.
The analysis of item variants (Research Question 2) resulted in
twomajor findings: First, subtle variations were often overlooked,
resulting in answers expected for the original item. In the
case of the complementary variant, the majority of responses
evidently assumed the text of the original item. This clearly
demonstrates that memorization plays a role in these responses.
This assumption is bolstered by the analyis of response times,
demonstrating that responses linked to the original item are
given much faster than responses expected for the variant: many
participants seemed to have relied on answers stored in memory.
Second, a more obvious variation of the original item (the
transformed variant) resulted in clear differences in response
patterns: The correct response was given at a reduced rate and
clear response time differences emerged between correct and
intuitive responses as predicted by the theory.
The analysis of panel tenure and previous exposure to
the bat-and-ball problem provided some answers to Research
Question 3: Panel tenure had a substantial (positive) impact on
the proportion of correct responses. This effect was exclusive to
participants who reported seeing the item before (which in itself
exhibited a strong correlation with panel tenure). The pattern
for item confusion showed the opposite trend: experienced
participants were much more likely to overlook subtle variations
of the original item. Finally, for the transformed variant, tenure
had a reduced impact on correct responses.
Regarding Research Question 4, data collected recently from
Qualtrics participants gives a strong indication that exposure
to the CRT and the subsequent increase in scores observed on
MTurk is not a general phenomenon created by media coverage
or teaching efforts.
3. STUDY 2: COMPARING THE ORIGINAL
AND A TRANSFORMED CRT
The observed effect of panel tenure on solution rates is
a practice effect, based on the results of Study 1. Errors
observed for the trivial and complementary variants showed that
improvements were partially due to mindless memorization. Yet,
mere memorization could not explain the relatively high rate
of correct responses to the transformed variant. This suggested
that a parallel version of the CRT based on transformed items
could be a reasonable alternative selectively targeting mindless
memorization without punishing those familiar with the original.
Study 2 compared the original CRT with a transformed variant,
regarding response process and validity in an MTurk sample.
3.1. Research Questions
Study 2 aimed to address two research questions. Confronting
participants with two variants of the CRT allowed me to address
Research Question 5:
Research Question 5. How does a transformed variant of the CRT
relate to the original?
Beyond the direct comparison of responses to the two sets
of items, Research Question 6 was aimed to compare the
relationships of the two scales with other variables, such as panel
tenure andmeasures of constructs that were expected to correlate
with the CRT (and therefore also with its variant):
Research Question 6. What is the relationship between the two
scales, panel tenure and measures of related concepts?
Specifically, measures of financial literacy and subjective
numeracy were collected for all participants in Study 2.
3.2. Methods
3.2.1. Sample
The study was conducted within a longer sequence of tasks on
MTurk in August 2018. The HITs were announced to last 20–30
min for most participants and offered a fixed payment of $3.00
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with a bonus of up to $1.00. Participation was restricted to US
participants with a minimum of 98% acceptance rating and 101
completed HITs. At the time of the study, data quality concerns
on MTurk were voiced by multiple researchers. Consistent with
the account in Kennedy et al. (2018), location data revealed
a relatively high number of attempts from Venezuela (in
spite of the location filter). These attempts were automatically
blocked and subsequent attempts that used the same MTurk
IDs (spoofing a US location) were not excluded. Of 1,109
survey attempts, only 918 sessions reached the introductory
demographics section after passing the attention checks and 729
participants completed the survey. A careful analysis of double
participation, IP address clusters, and non-US participants led to
a final sample size of n3 = 700. Participants were on average 36.4
years old (SD = 10.5 years), and 49.1% categorized themselves
as female (50.6% as male, 2 participants chose neither category).
The median number of previously completed HITs was 5528.5
(M = 40, 554, SD = 172, 488.5 HITs). Participants reported
medians of 14 months and 19 weekly hours working on MTurk.
3.2.2. Survey Questions
The transformation used in Study 1 left the structure of the task
intact and only shifted the numbers (and added the attribute
“golden”). It is possible to generate a potentially unlimited
number of item “clones” (Glas and van der Linden, 2003;
Arendasy and Sommer, 2013; Lathrop and Cheng, 2017) with
different solutions but similar difficulty by changing an item’s
incidental but not its radical elements (Irvine, 2002). The
Supplementary Material section 3 provides such item models
(Arendasy and Sommer, 2012) for the three original CRT items.
Knowing the original solution should convey an advantage in
solving transformed items, as long as this knowledge is based on
problem insight and not mindless memorization. In Study 2, the
original CRT was compared with a transformed variant (CRTt)
in a within-subject design. The three transformed variants (the
first is taken from Study 1) that comprise the CRTt are presented
in Table 1.
All CRT items appeared before the first CRTt item. Further,
two additional scale measures were selected as correlates for
validation based on previous findings for the CRT, namely
subjective numeracy (Fagerlin et al., 2007) and financial
literacy (Hastings et al., 2013). All items are listed in the
Supplementary Material section 1.3.
3.3. Results
3.3.1. Average Score and Inter-correlation
The mean CRT score (M = 1.93, SD = 1.19) was higher
than the mean CRTt score [M = 1.60, SD = 1.13, t(699) =
13.05, p < 0.001, drm = 2810, two-sided paired samples t-
test]. Note that possible practice effects within the task would
advantage the CRTt. Both scores are substantially higher than
the observed mean score for the Qualtrics sample (M = 0.45)
and still higher than average scores reported for the CRT in
Frederick (2005). Further, CRT and CRTt scores were highly
10This effect size measure is based on Dunlap et al. (1996, p. 171), as implemented
in Lenhard and Lenhard (2016).
correlated (r = 0.84, N = 700, p < 0.001), mainly due to
large groups of participants with minimum andmaximum scores
for both tests (see Supplementary Material section 2.2.2). The
high correlation was a positive indicator for both the reliability of
the original CRT and the internal validity of the CRTt. It is also
consistent with the level of retest-reliability found in Stagnaro
et al. (2018, r = 0.81).
3.3.2. MTurk Tenure
Comparing groups with different amounts of previous MTurk
experience revealed a systematic difference between the score
distributions for the two tests. Figure 5 illustrates the distribution
of test scores split by panel tenure. Differences between test scores
were more pronounced for experienced participants: While the
CRT scores exhibited a distinct ceiling effect for participants with
2,500 HITs and higher, this effect was much less pronounced for
the CRTt, the four score categories were more evenly distributed
for groups with up to 100,000 HITs. Consistent with this
observation, the correlation between the score on the original
CRT and tenure (the logarithm of the number of HITs) was
higher (ro = 0.25, p < 0.001, N = 700) than the correlation
between the score on the CRTt and tenure (rt = 0.17, p < 0.001,
N = 700). The difference between these dependent correlations
was significant (ZH = 3.49, p < 0.001, Steiger’s Z, two-sided test
for equality; Hoerger, 2013).
The individual item analyses—shown in Figure 6—revealed
that for all three items, scores increased with panel tenure to a
significant degree, mainly driven by the first and third item. On
the first item, 11 participants had a better result for the CRTt, 69
participants for the CRT. For the second item, 22 had a better
score on the CRTt, 11 a worse score. For the third item, only 6
had a better score on the CRTt, 189 had a worse score.
3.3.3. Scale Version and Response Types
Figure 7 compares the distribution of frequent responses to
the three question pairs, and adds the results obtained for the
Qualtrics sample as reference points. For item 1, the bat-and-
ball problems, both variants were answered correctly at a much
higher proportion than the original problem on Qualtrics, which
was true for all three items. Participants on Qualtrics also differed
in their more frequent production of unique responses. Between
the variants, the observed worse performance for the transformed
version (about 8%) was due to a similar increase in both
intuitive responses and infrequent other responses. Responses
linked to the original question were rarely observed. There
were similar response distributions for item 2, again with little
confusion between the items. Differences between the variants
were more pronounced for item 3. The lower performance for
the transformed variant was due to some interference between
variants: One group of participants gave the correct solution,
another group the false, intuitive answer to the original question.
Both groups together comprised nearly a third of the sample.
Response times (see the Supplementary Material section 2.2.1
for a graphical summary) showed a similar pattern as in Study1:
Correct solutions were associated with shorter average times for
the original items on MTurk and the expected longer response
times for CRTt items (and original items in the Qualtrics data).
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FIGURE 5 | Absolute frequencies of CRT scores and deviations for CRTt scores split by categories of self-reported number of completed HITs in Study 2: Each row
reports on the group of participants whose number of reported HITs falls into the specified interval. The left mosaic plot shows absolute numbers of the four possible
scores, the numbers on the right side show differences for the CRTt frequencies, with positive numbers indicating a larger frequency for the CRTt. Each rectangle is
proportional in size to the observed frequency of the combination of score and participant group. Relative frequencies of the five categories are reported in the middle
column.
FIGURE 6 | Proportion of participants giving correct answers to the three items in Study 2 split by panel tenure: Markers represent proportions of correct answers
split by self-reported number of HITs, vertical lines represent 95% CIs for the proportions.
3.3.4. Correlations With Other Measures and Gender
Effects
The reduction in ceiling effect demonstrated for the CRTt
compared to the CRT would allow, in principle, for a better
differentiation between experienced participants and a better
predictive performance— if the finer differentiation was indeed
related to the measured construct. To test this, I consider
one categorical variable (gender) and two continuous cognitive
measures (subjective numeracy and financial literacy) that have
been shown to be related with the original CRT (Frederick, 2005;
Campitelli and Labollita, 2010; Cokely et al., 2012; Bialek and
Pennycook, 2017).
3.3.4.1. Gender
Gender information was collected for both the second MTurk
sample and the Qualtrics sample. A repeated-measures ANOVA
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FIGURE 7 | Relative frequencies of response categories for the three items
(rows) in the original version (CRT, left columns) and transformed variant (CRTt,
right column) in Study 2: All non-listed responses are categorized as Other,
error bars mark the 95% CI of the proportion. Bars correspond to the results in
the MTurk sample, for the CRT items, results for the Qualtrics sample are
marked by the letter Q with CI bars.
for the MTurk data with scale version as within-factor and
gender and HIT number category as between-factors, showed a
significant (ordinal) interaction of version and gender [F(1,688) =
4.03, p = 0.04, partial η2 = 0.006] and significant main
effects for version [F(1,688) = 117.51, p < 0.001, partial η
2
=
0.15] and gender [F(1,688) = 6.89, p = 0.009, partial η
2
=
0.01]. Table 2 presents means for female and male participants
across the variants and samples and illustrates both effects: Male
participants have higher scores than female participants for both
tests, while this difference is larger for the CRTt than for the
CRT11. In addition, there was a main effect for HIT number
category [F(4,688) = 9.62, p < 0.001, partial η
2
= 0.05]—
the practice effect—and an interaction between version and HIT
number [F(4,688) = 5.90, p < 0.001, partial η
2
= 0.03], as
illustrated in Figure 5. Table 2 also reports the corresponding
results for the Qualtrics sample (with participants likely to have
had less exposure to the CRT, as reflected in the lower mean
11Based on a reviewer’s suggestion I also calculated an ANOVA without the tenure
variable. In this analysis, both main effects for gender and version are stronger,
but the interaction between version and gender is not significant [F(1,696) = 2.25,
p = 0.13, partial η2 = 0.003].
scores). The CRT score difference was larger in the Qualtrics than
in the MTurk sample, and similar to the CRTt difference, with all
scores lower in theQualtrics sample. Note that gender was chosen
because of demonstrated robust differences for correct and false
solutions in the past (Frederick, 2005; Campitelli and Labollita,
2010; Campitelli and Gerrans, 2014; Toplak et al., 2014; Cueva
et al., 2016), not because of substantive theory linking gender and
expected solution rates.
3.3.4.2. Subjective numeracy and financial literacy
Participants obtained a mean score of 13.7 (Md = 14, SD =
3.09) on the subjective numeracy scale and a mean score of 3.7
(Md = 4, SD = 1.16) on the financial literacy measure. For
both subjective numeracy and financial literacy, correlations with
the CRTt were higher than those with the CRT (see Table 3).
Again, these results can be interpreted as ambivalent news for
the CRT: On the one hand, correlations with related variables
prevailed in spite of familiarity and repeated exposure. On the
other hand, average scores seem to have increased beyond an
optimal point, such that a ceiling effect hurts differentiation
(the earlier floor effect is certainly no longer a concern). Thus,
at least for the observed sample, the transformation of items
increased correlations.
In conclusion, the proposed transformed variant was shown
to be promising for the use on MTurk. While the test might
require participants to spend more time, on average, correlations
with external measures were higher than for the original.
Further, only for the novel variant did response times differences
correspond to the assumed cognitive process. One might object
that the observed differences were connected to the ability
to deal with numerical information, as the CRT has been
criticized for its dependence on numeracy (e.g., Thomson and
Oppenheimer, 2016), so further research might be warranted.
The general construction principles applied (listed in the
Supplementary Material section 3) allow for the generation of
many more variants, which could potentially extend the viability
of the test for a long time.
3.3.5. Submission Comments
When submitting the HIT in Study 1, three participants who
had responded to the trivial variant alerted us to the discrepancy
with the standard version (e.g., “I think it’s supposed to say
the bat costs $1 MORE than the ball”). Part of the sample
of participants were asked (before the CRT questions) to
name tasks that they had encountered often or tasks that they
saw as being used too often to be valid any more. Of 360
participants, 240 gave a response to this question. Among these
open answers, 16 (7%) explicitly named CRT questions as tasks
the respondents had encountered frequently, this was a more
frequent response than the trolley problem (the most frequent
response with 17% concerned variants of the dictator game).
Some participants’ answer showed direct evidence of memorizing
responses, sometimes without insight. These anecdotal incidents
were more systematically investigated in Study 3.
3.4. Discussion
To address Research Question 5, a number of main findings in
Study 2 need to be jointly considered. A high correlation between
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TABLE 2 | Mean scale scores for the CRT (Qualtrics and MTurk) and the CRTt (MTurk) split by gender and test for differences (two-sided independent samples t-test;
Mturk: nfemale = 344, nmale = 354, Qualtrics: nfemale = 692, nmale = 546), 95% CI for the difference in group means and Cohen’s d.
Scale Sample Mfemale Mmale 1M t p 95%CI 1M d
CRT MTurk 1.78 2.07 0.29 3.26 0.001 [0.12, 0.47] −0.25
(1.21) (1.15)
CRTt MTurk 1.40 1.77 0.37 4.34 <0.001 [0.20, 0.53] −0.33
(1.11) (1.12)
CRT Qualtrics 0.28 0.66 0.38 8.23 <0.001 [0.29, 0.47] −0.46
(0.69) (0.93)
Standard deviations are presented in brackets below the means.
TABLE 3 | Pearson correlations and Steiger’s Z for original CRT (o) and new CRTt
(t) with subjective numeracy (Fagerlin et al., 2007) and financial literacy (Hastings
et al., 2013) in Study 2.
ro rt ZH
Subjective numeracy 0.24 0.30 −2.68
p <0.001 <0.001 0.007
Financial literacy 0.34 0.38 −1.95
p <0.001 <0.001 0.051
The p-value for ZH is the result of the two-sided test for equality of dependent correlations
(Hoerger, 2013).
original CRT and transformed CRTt can be considered as good
news for the validity (also for the reliability) of the original CRT.
If a substantial proportion of participant had learned correct
responses simply by memorizing correct answers, this would
have resulted in larger differences between the two measures. A
closer analysis of responses to original and transformed variants
nonetheless demonstrated that there were more participants
giving correct answers to the original and false answers to the
transformed items than participants with the opposite pattern.
The analysis of process variables showed larger differences
between the two scales than the analysis of response categories.
Regarding Research Question 6, Study 2 yielded relevant
results both regarding panel tenure and validation variables.
Both test variants showed a strong influence of panel tenure on
solution rates, but this relationship was more pronounced for
the original CRT. This resulted in a substantial ceiling effect
for experienced participants for the CRT that was considerably
reduced for the CRTt. At the same time, both scales still exhibit
a floor effect for inexperienced participants. The difference
between scales arguably resulted in differential correlations with
other measures, with the CRTt showing higher correlations than
the CRT for financial literacy12 and subjective numeracy.
12A p-value of 0.051 might incline some readers to see this statement refuted. I
would argue, in the spirit of divine preferences assumed by Rosnow and Rosenthal
(1989) that this still constitutes evidence for the difference that does not weaken
but strengthen the evidence regarding subjective numeracy.
4. STUDY 3: NOVEL ITEMS AND SOURCES
OF MEMORY
Study 3 explored MTurk participants’ sources for memorized
answers and the degree of compromised test items. In addition,
three novel items were tested to determine whether the acquired
resistance of MTurk participants to lure items generalized to
unfamiliar problem types.
4.1. Research Questions
Finally, Study 3 investigated sources of item familiarity and
measured performance on novel lure items.
Study 3 introduced two new elements: It featured novel items
that were clearly unrelated to the original CRT items but of a
similar problem type, and it included questions aimed at finding
out more about sources and types of answer memorization by
participants. The analysis of responses to the novel items allowed
to address Research Question 7.
Research Question 7. Is it possible to construct novel lure items
that work on MTurk?
Research Question 8 again extended the perspective to predictive
validity and the comparison between old and novel items
regaring the relationship with other variables:
Research Question 8. Are answers to novel items influenced
by panel tenure, and are they similarly predictive as the
original items?
The introduction of questions about memorization allowed to
address Research Question 9:
Research Question 9. How did participants learn and memorize
responses to the bat-and-ball item?
Specifically, I was interested in finding out whether
participants remembered responses or procedures. Study
3 was complemented by open-format questions about
participants’ attitudes toward the CRT. Answers are briefly
summarized below, and reported in more detail in the
Supplementary Material section 2.4.
4.2. Methods
4.2.1. Sample
The study was conducted on MTurk as part of a larger HIT in
early 2019. The HIT was announced to last 12–15 min for most
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FIGURE 8 | Average proportion of correct answers to item 1 (A) and item 2 (B) for participants in Study 3 that indicated exposure (black dots) or no exposure (white
dots) to the bat-and-ball problem, separated by the category of number of previous HITs on MTurk. Dot sizes correspond to the proportions of participants with and
without experience for a given category of HITs. Whiskers indicate 95% CI for the proportions.
participants and offered a fixed payment of $1.50 with a bonus
of up to $0.20. Participation was restricted to US participants,
with a minimum of 96% accepted HITs, but no requirement of
minimum number of HITs. Participants had to pass a screening
for VPN-, VPS- or proxy use via iphub.info (Burleigh et al.,
2018) and two out of three checks for attention, language
comprehension and nationality. A total of 1,341 participants
started the test, 1,066 passed the initial screening, and 1030
finished the test. Of these, nine were part of the pilot study, and
I excluded ten participants due to reasonable doubts about their
location or double IP addresses13, resulting in a final sample size
of n4 = 1, 011. Participants were on average 36.6 years old (SD =
11.9 years), and 46.8% categorized themselves as female (53.1%
as male, one participant chose neither category). The median
number of previously completed HITs was 2,950 (M = 21, 668,
SD = 103, 230.5).
4.2.2. Survey Questions
4.2.2.1. Item variants
Most participants answered five questions that were either
original CRT-items or variants. Here, I analyze the two original
items and two novel items listed in Table 1 that were presented
after two variants of CRT-items. The full list of items is presented
and analyzed in the Supplementary Material section 2.3. The
two novel variants were designed to be lure items.
4.2.2.2. Solution sources and strategies
After the bat-and ball question, participants were asked whether
they had encountered the task before. Depending on the
answer to this question, the survey included one of two
sets of follow-up questions. Participants who had encountered
13Participants who failed the initial test did not enter the study. All other exclusions
were decided upon before data analysis based on data for the initial check.
the item before were asked how often and where they had
encountered the item before, whether they had memorized
solutions or strategies, and whether they had ever received
feedback on their responses or incentives for correct answers
(see Supplementary Material section 1.4 for all questions).
Participants who had not encountered the item before were
asked whether they solved the task on their own or searched
for solutions. Both groups were asked—in an open response
format—about their opinion about the item and its use
on MTurk.
4.2.2.3. EV-scale
Participants made three choices between gambles, for which
participants scoring high on the CRT chose EV-maximizing
options in contrast to low-scoring participants in Frederick
(2005). The number of EV-maximizing choices was counted as
a simple score between 0 and 3.
4.2.2.4. Attention checks
Due to the requirement to pass at least two out of three attention
checks before the survey, participants in Study 3 had made
either one or zero errors. As CRT items and attention checks
share the element of intuitive, yet false responses, attention
check performance has been related to CRT results (Hauser and
Schwarz, 2015). Of the participants that entered the study, 126
(12.5%) committed one error across the three items.
4.3. Results
4.3.1. Original Items and MTurk Tenure
The relationship between panel tenure and solution rates for the
original two CRT items are presented in Figure 8. A comparison
of Figure 3A with Figure 8A shows that the practice effect found
in Study 1 for the bat-and-ball problem was replicated in Study 3,
and a similar effect was found for item 2.
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4.3.2. Novel Items
Figure 9 shows the results for the two novel items (and
the original items for benchmarking). Response frequencies
demonstrate that N1 and N2 both elicited a much higher
rate of intuitive than correct responses. Both novel items took
participants much longer to answer irrespective of answer type,
with correct answers taking the longest. The gaps in panel tenure
for the original items were less pronounced for N1 and N2.
These results suggest that the MTurk population has not been
immunized with respect to lure items, as there was no transfer to
novel puzzle items, even though the novel items were presented
after several blocks of other lure items.
Figure 10 shows cross-tabulations for solutions to original
and novel items. A worse performance for variants and novel
items was much more frequent than a better performance. For
all analyzed pairs, the majority of participants scored the same on
both items (see also the Supplementary Material section 2.3.5).
4.3.3. Validation Measures
Four measures were considered as validation measures for the
CRT items and variants. I compare respondents with correct and
false solutions in terms of gender and attention check errors, and
in terms of the EV-scale and CRT-solutions.
Table 4 presents proportions and differences in proportions
for respondents with correct and false solutions for each item
in Study 3. With respect to gender, the difference for the
original items was replicated, at a similar level as observed
in Study 1 for I1 (see Supplementary Material section 2.1.4)
and in a meta-analysis (Brañas-Garza et al., 2015). The largest
differences were seen for N2. A difference in attention check
errors was pronounced for the first, but not the second
original item.
Table 5 presents means and mean differences in EV-scale
and CRT-score for respondents with correct and false solutions
for each item in Study 3. With respect to the EV-scale, both
original items showed a difference in the expected direction. All
items showed differences in the same direction as the original
items. With respect to the CRT-score, the large difference for
the original items was unsurprising, as a minimum difference
of 1 was guaranteed. The observed differences for the novel
items were less obvious and can be regarded as an additional
confirmation that CRT items have not lost their validity.
These results are consistent with the finding that repeated
exposure to the CRT does not indiscriminately inflate scores and
add measurement error, as the two novel items allowed for a
relevant comparison: Both in terms of attention check errors and
the EV-scale, the original item allowed for a better differentiation
than the novel items.
4.3.4. Sources of Familiarity
4.3.4.1. Prevalence and type of previous exposure
A total of 32 participants indicated that they misclicked or
that the only time they had seen the question before was
in the HIT itself (or mistook item variants for the same
item). After correcting for these, 658 participants (65.6%) were
categorized as having seen the item before, 345 participants
FIGURE 9 | Results for item 1 (I1), item 2 (I2) and the two novel items (N1 and
N2) in Study 3. Subfigures show the proportion of intuitive and correct
responses (top row), average logarithmized response times for response types
(second row), and average logarithmized number of HITs (bottom row). Bars
represent 95%-CIs for proportions and means, respectively.
(34.4%) as not having seen the HIT before. A large majority
of participants who had encountered the bat-and-ball problem
before encountered it on MTurk (93.7%). The second most
frequent category (lecture/class/presentation) was chosen by only
6.9% of participants. Printed sources (2.0%) and internet forums
(2.0%) were named even less frequently. Few were able to name
the exact source. There were isolated references to videos on
sharing platforms or social media posts. These answers therefore
ran counter to the proposition that mostparticipants underwent
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FIGURE 10 | Cross-tabulation of correct and false responses for original and novel items (showing rounded percentages) in Study 3. Improvements from row item to
column item are captured in the lower left corner (in blue), worse performance in the upper right corner (in red).
TABLE 4 | Relative number of male participants and attention check errors: Proportions, differences in proportion and CIs for differences in proportions split by correct
and false solutions for the items in Study 3.
Gender AC error
pinc pcor 1 CI 1 pinc pcor 1 CI 1
I1 47.1% 60.5% 13.4% [7.2%, 19.4%] 15.6% 8.4% −7.3% [−11.2%, −3.2%]
I2 41.3% 60.9% 19.6% [12.5%, 26.5%] 14.0% 9.7% −4.4% [−9.1%, 0.2%]
N1 48.8% 56.0% 7.3% [−4.7%, 18.8%] 11.0% 8.8% −2.2% [−8.4%, 6.1%]
N2 52.0% 78.6% 26.6% [−5.8%, 44.4%] 14.4% 14.3% −0.1% [−9.7%, 17.5%]
TABLE 5 | EV-scale scores and performance on original items: Means, mean differences and CIs for the mean difference split by correct and false solutions for the items
in Study 3.
EV-scale CRT (1+2)
Minc Mcor 1 CI 1 Minc Mcor 1 CI 1
I1 1.49 1.97 0.48 [0.36, 0.59] 0.33 1.79 1.47 [1.40, 1.53]
I2 1.51 1.88 0.37 [0.23, 0.50] 0.20 1.67 1.46 [1.40, 1.53]
N1 1.62 1.79 0.17 [−0.06, 0.41] 0.88 1.51 0.62 [0.40, 0.84]
N2 1.71 2.00 0.29 [−0.06, 0.64] 0.92 1.86 0.95 [0.72, 1.18]
Note that correct or incorrect answers to I1 and I2 limit the possible range of values for CRT (1+2), affected cells show values in italics.
preparation for the CRT through MTurk-related websites and
public communication of the test’s solutions.
4.3.4.2. Feedback and bonus money
Of those with previous exposure to the item, only 35 (5.3%)
affirmed to have received feedback on any of their previous
attempts (20 were given only correct/false information, 15
received the correct solution). Still, more participants in this
group (85.7%) solved the item correctly than in the rest of the
pre-exposure group (52.6%). On the other hand, 51 participants
(7.8%) were offered money for giving the correct solution (36
of them did not receive feedback, though). A higher proportion
of participants who had received bonus money solved the item
correctly (74.5%) than of participants who had not received
bonus money (54.0%). Both results confirm that both incentives
and feedback can increase practice effects (e.g., Steger et al., 2018),
but that they are encountered rarely in CRT studies.
4.3.4.3. Memorization
Most participants with previous exposure to the bat-and-ball
item claimed to have memorized either the answer (27.5%)
or the calculation procedure (62.7%). The first group solved
the item correctly at the highest rate (63.0%) followed by
those with memorized procedure (56.6%). Participants without
memorization only reached a solution rate of 28.1%. While
the solution rates in the first two groups are high, the failure
rate is still substantial. This is—again—an indication that not
only correct answers and procedures are memorized, but also
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incorrect ones: The answers in the three groups fall into the
intuitive category (10 cents) at relative frequencies of 32.6,
41.3, and 60.9%, respectively. Thus, subtracting 1$ from 1.10$
is regarded as the correct procedure by the second group
(the Supplementary Material section 2.3.7 contains further
analyses of the relationship between memorization strategies
and performance).
The admitted memorization is consistent with observed
response time differences [F(2,654) = 7.14, p < 0.001, partial
η
2
= 0.02]. The fastest average logarithmized response times
were observed for those with memorized answers (M = 1.05,
95% CI = [1.00, 1.10]), followed by those with memorized
procedure (M = 1.12, 95% CI = [1.09, 1.15]) and those
without memorization (M = 1.23, 95% CI = [1.13, 1.32]). Of
those encountering the question for the first time, all but one
participant claimed to have come up with the answer on their
own. Nobody claimed to have searched for the answer online.
4.3.5. Open Answers
A research assistant coded open answers into several non-
exclusive categories (see Supplementary Material section 2.4 for
the full list, examples, and the coding scheme). The answers shed
some additional light on reasons for resistance to learning effects:
about one in three participants without problem exposure and
one participant in five with exposure interpreted the question
as very simple. The proportion of correct answers in this group
was below average. One theory—that those with prior exposure
explicitly endorsed—interpreted the question as an attention
check (6.5% of answers in this group) or a test (5.4%). Again,most
of these participants answered incorrectly. Some participants
suspected a trick (13.4% for first time exposure, 5.8% for repeated
exposure), but also answered mostly incorrectly. Those who
expressed liking the problem (7.0%/12.5%) had higher solution
rates (50%/73.3%) than those expressing dislike (5.1%/6.4%;
with solution rates of 18.8% and 52.3%, respectively). Few
people (7.3%) in the repeated-exposure group declared the item
“overused” (with a 70.0% solution rate) or found no challenge in
it (4.1% with a solution rate of 96.4%). One in ten participants
spontaneously named other CRT items (70% of these solved
the item).
4.4. Discussion
Results for response categories and process variables confirm
that it is still possible to construct novel lure items on MTurk,
which answers Research Question 7 in the affirmative. Both the
differences in proportions between correct and intuitive answers
and the differences in response times are more pronounced for
novel items than for original items.
Regarding Research Question 8, correct responses to novel
items are given by more experienced participants, but the effect
is weaker than for the original items. A plausible explanation
would be some generalization in learning the responses to
the original items or, at least, generalized skepticism toward
seemingly easy questions. Results for validation measures and
relationships with other variables are somewhat mixed, but taken
as a whole would rather speak in favor of the original items:
Differences between respondents with correct and incorrect
answers in gender proportions, attention check errors, and the
EV-scales aremore pronounced for the original than for the novel
items. Solutions to novel items predict solutions to the original
items. A plausible explanation for this difference might be the
comparatively higher difficulty of the novel items. Further, it is
not entirely clear out of which larger set the original items might
have been selected.
Finally, Research Question 9 is directly addressed by
participants’ responses to the memorization question. Most
participants (about two in three) admitted to having seen the
problem before. In this group, about nine in ten participants
indicated that they had memorized either the answer or the
calculation procedure for the bat-and-ball problem (most had
memorized the procedure). At the same time, memorized
answers and procedures were not necessarily the correct
responses. One in three participants who had memorized a
response had memorized the intuitive response and 40% of
those having memorized a procedure arrived at this intuitive
answer. These results flesh out the interpretation of response time
differences observed throughout the studies in this manuscript.
Note that the Supplementary Material presents further
qualitative results and discusses responses to a number of item
variants not featured in this manuscript.
5. GENERAL DISCUSSION AND
CONCLUSION
As in earlier research, the degree of reported familiarity with the
bat-and-ball problem reported by MTurk participants was high.
Overall, the presented results can be taken both as reassuring
news for the continued use of the CRT on the MTurk platform
and as a note of concern regarding particular applications. There
is clear evidence that some participants have either memorized
solutions or remember strategies they applied to the task when
encountering it before. It is potentially reassuring that false
solutions do not seem to be memorized and repeated at a lower
rate than correct solutions. In fact, participants with higher
cognitive reflection seemed to notice the inappropriateness of
memorized answers more readily, which fits with the idea of a
“metacognitive disadvantage” (Bialek and Pennycook, 2017) for
those with low CRT scores. If first answers are merely carried
forward by some participants and learning over time is biased
toward those with higher cognitive reflection, then the validity
of measured scale values will be protected against repeated
exposure. Theremight be limits to this general reassuring finding,
though. Here, I discuss the two major concerns that motivated
the studies, the dangers of mindless memorization and task
confusion, before concluding by suggesting counter-measures to
these problems.
5.1. The Danger of Mindless Memorization
Reproducing memorized answers or performing practiced
calculations can constitute a “backdoor response strategy”
(Morley et al., 2004), in that it is a “simple procedure that does
not require a high level of ability” (p. 25). Crucially, this strategy
would not even change test scores if all participants simply
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reproduced their original answers. The studies offer evidence for
this type of repetition, but also demonstrate practice effects. At
the same time, memorization observed across studies did not
seem to be mindless for the most part. Learning did not seem to
occur for randomly chosen participants but for those with higher
degrees of cognitive reflection.
While this selectivity helps to maintain the validity of the
scale, continued exposure to the items seems to afford learning
to an increasing proportion of the population. This can result
in ceiling effects (Study 2) and ultimately reduce the validity of
the scale. As another consequence, for experienced participants
standard norms for populations might no longer be applicable,
and it might be advisable to include prior experience in models
(see also Thomson and Oppenheimer, 2016). By overcoming
the need for reflection, experienced participants break the link
between process variables, such as response time, and outcome
variables. After recognizing a previously solved item, participants
will solve it faster and are unlikely to require disinhibition of
the previously intuitive response. At best, a correct solution from
memory can be interpreted as a signature of earlier reflection, at
worst, as the outcome of vicarious learning. Further, platform-
based learning beyond CRT items might constitute a confound
for validation studies, if participants that learned solutions to
the CRT also acquired solutions to numeracy scales or other
validationmeasures. This may inflate true correlations and would
likely be more pronounced in samples of both experienced
and inexperienced participants. These are by no means safe
predictions, as the platform dynamics of MTurk ultimately
determine the rate of turnover, panel tenure and recruitment.
But it would likewise be ill-advised to simply assume the
continued validity of scales across years of repeated use without
regular checks.
5.2. The Danger of Task Confusion
A second vulnerability of environments with experienced
participants is illustrated by the high percentage of mismatched
answers to the complementary variant. Tasks and item formats
encountered frequently tend to be identified more readily by
MTurk participants, and merely similar items might be mistaken
for the familiar ones. This is a more general problem on the
platform that is exacerbated by the lack of information about and
the limited degree of control over a participant’s previous sessions
and experiments. Schneider (2015) warned that “[i]n the rush to
get to the next HIT, Turkers may provide a prefab answer without
internalizing the subtleties that the researcher meant to convey.”
This is not a trivial problem as many experiments choose
manipulations that are subtle variations of more frequently used
manipulations; such as adding words to change the context
or partially varying payoff structures. Thus, participants might
encounter more than one experimental condition of the same
experimental design across studies, which has been reported to
decrease effect sizes (Chandler et al., 2015). At least the CRTt
correlated to a higher degree with validation measures than the
CRT in Study 2.
A related problem is posed by encountered differences
in research ethics and common practices between academic
requesters (e.g., Hertwig and Ortmann, 2001). For example,
deception in experiments—regarded as a last resort in most
ethical guidelines (Hertwig and Ortmann, 2008)—is frequently
used on MTurk even where deception-free alternatives are
readily available. As a consequence, trust in requesters and
researchers has been eroded (Milland, 2015), causing serious
problems for both users and non-users of deception. The veracity
of instructions is fundamentally doubted by at least some
participants (Ortmann and Hertwig, 2002). Stewart et al. (2017)
likened this situation to a tragedy of the commons, where studies
of one lab can “contaminate the pool for other laboratories
running other studies” (p. 744). Long-term participants will
perpetuate the problem of task confusion and interference
between practices.
5.3. A Special Status for the CRT?
There is ample evidence found cross several disciplines that
repeated exposure to the same test material changes response
distributions. Neuroscientists (e.g., Theisen et al., 1998; Basso
et al., 2002; Collie et al., 2003; Bird et al., 2004) are concerned
about practice effects (Bartels et al., 2010) as they might inflate
diagnostic test results. Their absencemight even be diagnostically
relevant (Mitrushina and Satz, 1991; McCaffrey and Westervelt,
1995; Hickman et al., 2000; Calamia et al., 2012). Repeat
participants in personnel selection procedures often improve on
test scores, as observed with French pilots (Matton et al., 2011)
or applicants in law enforcement (Hausknecht et al., 2002) and
medicine (Wolkowitz, 2011; O’Neill et al., 2015). Test practice
and coaching can improve results on standardized aptitude tests
(Kulik et al., 1984a,b; Arendasy et al., 2016), even without actual
ability improvements (Matton et al., 2011). Likewise, the repeated
use of test items in medical classroom exams over years was
accompanied by a decrease in difficulty and discriminability
(Joncas et al., 2018; Panczyk et al., 2018).
Looking at some of the established moderators of practice
effects (e.g., Steger et al., 2018), there are some reasons why the
CRT should be especially vulnerable: MTurk is an unproctored
setting (Tippins et al., 2006; Carstairs and Myors, 2009),
and correct responses are easy to memorize and search for,
involve complex processing and a moment of realization. These
properties have been linked to higher degrees of practice effects
(Bornstein et al., 1987; Rapport et al., 1997; Collie et al., 2003;
Reeve and Lam, 2007; Arthur et al., 2009; Calamia et al., 2012;
Lezak et al., 2012).
As discussed above, realizing the falsity of previous, intuitive
response might be more likely for those with higher levels of
cognitive reflection. Kulik et al. (1984b) found that practice
effects were more pronounced for those with higher level of
abilities. Rapport et al. (1997) found higher IQ gains in repeated
measurement for those with higher scores at the first testing,
which they likened to a Matthew effect (the “rich get richer,”
but see Basso et al., 1999; Bartels et al., 2010). Stagnaro et al.
(2018), along with Bialek and Pennycook (2017) interpreted
their finding of stable CRT validity in this way. In this sense,
repeated exposure might even reduce measurement error by
giving multiple opportunities to activate the possessed potential.
This can even be linked to the use of trial rounds by economists—
and to a lesser degree by psychologists (Hertwig and Ortmann,
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2001)— to eliminate simple forms ofmisunderstanding and place
participants on an equal footing.
The results presented here lend some support to the theory
that CRT score improvements are predominantly restricted
to participants with a higher degree of cognitive reflection,
insulating its validity somewhat (but not entirely) against practice
effects. This result does not easily extend to other heavily used
measures onMTurk for which the two identified problems might
loom as larger threats.
5.4. Solutions: Item Monitoring, Parallel
Forms and Comprehension Checks
If MTurk were a platform maintained by researchers, keeping
track of participants’ testing history across all research projects
might be a valuable strategy for preventing unintended double
exposure or for gauging previous experience. As it stands,
this type of information would likely create privacy risks for
participants and require individual effort from requesters. While
the number of previous HITs is not available as a variable (it can
only be inferred from chosen qualifications), the self-reported
number of HITs proved to be a useful proxy in this study
and is simple to elicit. MTurk cannot be considered a secure
test environment, psychological tests employed on the platform
will be exposed to the public. The repeated use of test types
vulnerable to exposure requires the choice between two different
strategies to maintain test validity: monitoring the existing item
pool for potentially compromised tasks or generating a larger set
of test variants.
5.4.1. Item Monitoring
Monitoring can be difficult (McLeod and Lewis, 1999; Zhang,
2014) and has no teeth without the ability to replace
compromised items, as the “fight for pool security is ultimately
a losing battle” (Davey and Nering, 2002, p. 187). It can be aided
by items testing for pre-exposure (self-reports or item variants,
see Study 1) or the analysis of response times (Choe et al., 2018).
Item monitoring requires a continued efforts to detect problems
when they occur or develop to a critical point.
5.4.2. Parallel Forms
On the other hand, parallel forms of cognitive tests have reduced
practice effects in the past (Kulik et al., 1984b; Benedict and
Zgaljardic, 1998; Beglinger et al., 2005; Calamia et al., 2012) and
can enhance test security (Burke, 2009; Guo et al., 2009; Panczyk
et al., 2018). Parallel test cannot address test sophistication or
learning effects (Wood, 2009; Bartels et al., 2010), but they
might help to separate these from item-specific factors (Rapport
et al., 1997; Hausknecht et al., 2002). Of course, these advantages
can be negated if alternative forms are of different difficulty or
lower validity (Davey and Nering, 2002; Calamia et al., 2012;
Lezak et al., 2012). While the benefits might be increased with
item generation procedures that allow at the limit for unique
tests for each tested individual (Irvine, 2002), simple alternate
forms (see e.g., Thomson and Oppenheimer, 2016) should be
considered and evaluated on a continuous basis, when faced with
returning participants.
It still seems puzzling to me why the same items are used in
most studies investigating cognitive reflection. Item norms are
impacted by platform dynamics over time, and Thomson and
Oppenheimer (2016) called the CRT an “expendable resource” (p.
109). Simple parallel forms are still vulnerable to memorization.
For example, Milland (2016) offers solutions to the CRT 2
(Thomson and Oppenheimer, 2016). The transformed items
(CRTt) are a step toward a solution. Validating item sets with a
common item structure and a rich collection of viable number
sets would go a long way to avoid the vulnerability that a
simple memorization of numbers can be mistaken for cognitive
reflection, and it would avoid both construct proliferation and
reliance on ad-hocmeasures.
5.4.3. Comprehension Checks
To detect instances of task confusion, researchers can employ
comprehension checks that emphasize differences in the target
task compared to tasks that are assumed to be encountered
frequently on the platform. For example, if a task with a single
participant bears resemblance to tasks encountered with player
interaction, it is a good idea to stress this difference in the
instructions and test for comprehension before (or after) the task.
As the examples in this study demonstrate, it cannot be assumed
that seemingly familiar instructions and questions are read word-
by-word by experienced participants without incentives.
5.4.4. Tradeoffs
The results in Study 3 put focus on some ethical tradeoffs
involved in research on MTurk The principle of beneficence
would advise researchers to give feedback to participants after the
test to help them realize potential carelessness in their thinking.
At the same time, ethical guidelines advise psychologists not
to allow test stimuli to “become part of the public domain”
(Tranel, 1994, p. 34) to avoid the invalidation of cognitive
measures. The APA guidelines require that “[p]sychologists
make reasonable efforts to maintain the integrity and security
of test materials and other assessment techniques” (American
Psychological Association, 2002, p. 1072). In some cases, public
disclosure of test materials was found to maintain validity of the
tests (Goldberg et al., 2006; Condon and Revelle, 2014). Direct
harm to participants is a less likely scenario, it might occur
if practice effects hide cognitive decline in medical exams and
prevent proper treatment. The limited results on feedback in this
study would advise caution in giving feedback on CRT answers
to participants who might be tested again.
5.5. Conclusion
To conclude, using several variants of items featured in the
cognitive reflection test, it was demonstrated thatmany responses
on MTurk, but not on a similar platform, are influenced by test
experience and exhibit practice effects. Repeated exposure has
been discussed as benign in the literature, and the continuing
validity of the CRT was confirmed in the present studies. The
results still point at two vulnerabilities of frequently used tasks:
(1) the possibility of memorization (based on personal insight or
public information) that may fundamentally change the response
process, and (2) the possibility of interference and noise created
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by mistaking a presented task for a merely similar task that
was previously experienced on the platform. Both problems may
impact a research project in foreseeable and—given the vast
number of studies run on the platform—also unforeseeable ways.
These vulnerabilities are exacerbated by the reliance on a single
set of three items. Looking back a century into the beginning of
intelligence testing, Davey and Nering (2002) stated that “[i]t was
not unusual in the early days of psychological measurement for
test developers to produce only a single form and to administer
that form whenever it was needed.” (p. 167). While the Stanford
Binet-Simon Intelligence scale received alternative forms in 1937,
the CRT is still predominantly employed in a single form.
As seen in previous research and partially replicated in this
manuscript, this does not necessarily invalidate obtained results
or negate the CRT’s usefulness as a cognitive measure for the
time being, but the observed trends give nonetheless reasons
for concern. Alternative task formats that may help to address
future problems with the CRT may include generative item
structures that can be filled with multiple sets of numbers to
prevent memorization, and Study 2 and Study 3 resulted in some
promising steps in this direction. Upon reflection on cognitive
reflection, validating these item structures might be a sensible
step to ensure the continued productivity of cognitive reflection
research, and a good approach formeasures less protected against
repeated exposure.
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